ABSTRACT This paper addresses enhancing the physical layer security of a downlink non-orthogonal multiple access systems. The proposed scheme consists of a base station, multiple legitimate users, and an eavesdropper. In each transmission slot, the base station communicates with two paired users, under the malicious attempts of the eavesdropper to intercept the information messages. In order to impair the eavesdropper's channel without affecting the legitimate paired users, a jamming signal is injected into the system by means of null-steering beamforming. In null-steering precoding, the jamming signal is directed toward the malicious node while being suppressed in the legitimate users' directions. Null-steering jamming is exploited in two different mainstreams, namely, self-cooperative and nonself-cooperative jamming. In the self-cooperative strategy, the base station implements the null-steering beamformer to transmit the jamming signal during the information exchange with the legitimate users, whereas in the nonself-cooperative jamming scheme, idle legitimate users (helpers) utilize the harvested energy in the first phase to transmit the jamming signal toward the eavesdropper in the second phase during the base station communication with the legitimate users. The outage behavior in the two considered scenarios is investigated, and the secrecy outage probability for both paired users is derived and provided in closed-form expressions. Numerical simulations are performed to validate the derived analytical results and to compare the two considered strategies secrecy performance. Comparisons yield that self-cooperative jamming has better outage behavior unless the number of helpers in the system is large enough.
I. INTRODUCTION
The fifth-generation (5G) communication systems have many anticipated new services and functionalities such as high rate, massive connectivity and low latency [1] . In order to meet up with these requirements, a variety of novel technologies are involved such as new multiple access techniques, new spectrum and power utilization methods, multi-antenna and fullduplexing [2] , [3] . Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) has been considered as a key enabling technology for the 5G communication systems [4] . The main idea of NOMA is to achieve multiple access by exploiting power domain for modulation processing and multiplexing of users based on the power differences among the different users. Unlike the conventional water-filling power allocation schemes, NOMA base station allocates more power to the user with poorer channel conditions (weak user), and less power to that with better channel status (strong user) for enhanced throughput-fairness trade-off. NOMA allows multiple users to simultaneously access the same time/frequency resource, by deploying the superposition coding (SC) and successive interference cancellation (SIC) techniques at the base station and the strong user's terminal respectively [5] . NOMA strong user subtracts weak user's information message from the superimposed message to decode the own. Since NOMA weak user is allocated with greater power level, his message is decoded directly by considering strong user's message as interference [6] .
On the other hand, the appealing features of increased users number and extended the radio coverage area result in security threats that necessitate further secure measurements to be adopted [7] . Physical layer (PHY) security has been recognized as powerful tool for guaranteeing information privacy in wireless networks, wherein the imperfect physical characteristics of the wireless system are exploited to become security sources and enhance the secrecy performance. Wyner [8] proved that PHY security is fully met if the wire-tap is worse than that of the legitimate user. Hence, different jamming schemes are exploited to degrade the wire-tap channel condition without affecting the legitimate users' channels. Jamming strategies can be categorized according to technical perspectives into two different mainstreams, nonself-cooperative jamming and self-cooperative jamming [9] . In self-cooperative jamming, the multi-antenna transmitter implements the beamforming scheme to transmit the artificial jamming signal towards the eavesdropper while communicating with the intended receiver [10] . Nonselfcooperative approach involves trusted nodes in the system referred to as helpers to transmit jamming signal to impair the channel quality of the malicious nodes during the information exchange between transmitter and receiver [11] . However, helpers cooperation is limited in nonself-cooperative scheme due to energy scariness in wireless networks, and techniques such as harvest-and-jam (HJ) are proposed [12] to overcome this problem. In HJ schemes, the transmitter powers the helpers wirelessly so the helpers used the harvested energy for transmitting the jamming signal. Another approach to guarantee data confidentiality is null-steering beamforming technique, wherein the information-bearing signal is directed towards the intended receiver while being nulled in the eavesdroppers directions [13] .
A lot of literature on enhancing the secrecy performance of NOMA systems by means of PHY security has appeared lately. NOMA legitimate eavesdropper scenario wherein weak or strong user is considered as a potential eavesdropper who is trying to intercept the other user's information has been addressed in [14] and [15] respectively. Qin et al. [16] and Liu et al. [17] investigate enhancing information security of large-scale NOMA networks with external eavesdropper scenario. PHY security is enhanced in [16] by introducing the concept of the protected zone around the source node. Whereas the AN technique is exploited in [17] to enhance the secrecy outage probability in multiple-antenna transmission scenario. The AN-aided secure scheme is introduced to cooperative cognitive NOMA communication system in [18] in order to enhance the secrecy performance of the primary network. Lv et al. [19] revisit the AN-aided secure NOMA systems for imperfect SIC process and derive the secrecy outage probability and secrecy order in this case. In NOMA AN technique the noise signal is broadcast in the orthogonal directions of the intended NOMA user, resulting in not only the degradation of the wire-tap link, but also the link between the base station and the other NOMA legitimate users. The AN signal of the weak user adds extra interference signals to the strong user yielding incorrect SIC execution and imperfect decoding the own message. In addition, strong user AN signal mitigates the signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) at the weak user and hence his ability to decode his information message.
In this work, PHY security is revisited to enhance information confidentiality of downlink NOMA systems. As NOMA system considers two active users at least in each transmission slot, jamming signal is transmitted using the null-steering beamforming to be directed towards the eavesdropper, while putting the legitimate users in the null directions of the beamformer. Null-steering jamming is exploited in two different strategies, self-cooperative and nonself-cooperative jamming. In the self-cooperative scheme, the base station jams the wire-tap while communicating with the intended receivers. Whereas the two-phase HJ technique is adopted in the nonself-cooperative scheme. In the first phase, the base station adopts simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) scheme to transmit power and the information needed to build the jamming beamformer to the helpers. Helpers deploy power-splitting scheme to divide the power received between information decoding and energy harvesting processes. In the second phase, the helpers transmit the jamming signal towards the malicious node by means of nullsteering beamforming while putting the legitimate users in the nulls directions during their information exchange with the base station. In order to adopt the best jamming strategy, the secrecy performance provided by both schemes is compared to demonstrate which jamming strategy performs better and under which conditions. The secrecy outage probability of both schemes is derived and provided in closed-form formulas. In addition, numerical simulations are carried out to validate the derived results and compare the two considered jamming schemes secrecy performance and their conditions of optimality.
During this work, we assume the following assumptions: A1. The global CSI of all nodes including the eavesdropper is available at the base station which is a basic assumption in the PHY security literature. The assumption on eavesdropper's CSI availability is applicable in the scenarios where the eavesdropper is also an active user of the system with different services from that of the intended users. Hence, its communications can be detected and monitored by the base station [20] . This assumption is week if the eavesdropper is idle as it is difficult to obtain its CSI in this scenario. However, some works on designing the beamforming matrix based on partial CSI have appeared recently [10] .
A2. The eavesdropper has strong decoding capabilities to detect multi-user data, and hence can distinguish the messages of the different users easily [21] . This assumption overestimates the eavesdropper's decoding abilities, so the derived results represent lower bounds of the practical ones.
A3. We assume only two active legitimate users per transmission slot. However, the system model is scalable and can be extended to more than two active users (but less than the base station antenna number) by simply adding nulls in these active users' directions. We adopt only two active users so our results will be compared with the AN baseline scheme introduced by Liu et al. [17] , wherein only two paired users are considered.
A4. Without loss of generality, maximum ratio transmission (MRT) is adopted by the base station to transmit the information-bearing signal to the intended users. Other beamforming can be adopted as well, but the MRT scheme is chosen as it provides high diversity gain and high SINR when compared to other techniques.
A. CONTRIBUTION OF THE PAPER
The contributions of this work can be summarized as follows:
• Null-steering beamforming implementation for enhancing the PHY security of NOMA systems is investigated in two scenarios. First this technique is deployed by the base station to impair the eavesdropper intercepting capabilities without affecting the intended NOMA users' links. While in the second scenario, the idle nodes used the harvested energy in the first time-slot to implement null-steering jamming.
• The exact secrecy outage probability of the paired users are derived and introduced in closed-form expressions for the both considered scenarios. The derived analytical formulas confirm that null-steering beamforming technique has better secrecy outage behavior than the AN-aided secure NOMA system proposed in [17] .
• Furthermore, comparisons of the secrecy outage probability between the considered scenarios yield that selfcooperative jamming has better outage performance than that of the nonself-cooperative jamming strategy.
As the nonself-cooperative scheme involves two transmission phases (energy transfer and information transfer). In addition power transfer suffers from path loss and imperfect energy conversion making the power used by the helpers less than the transmuted one. However, with large number of helpers the nonself-cooperative jamming strategy outperforms the self-cooperative scheme, as the increased number of the helpers implies higher jamming power level.
B. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, null-steering jamming technique implemented by the base station directly is investigated, where the secrecy outage probability is derived. In Section III, nonself-cooperative null-steering harvest-and-jam scheme is proposed and the secrecy behavior is investigated in the considered scenario.
Simulation numerical results are presented in Section IV for verifying the derived expressions, which is followed by conclusions in Section V.
II. SELF-COOPERATIVE JAMMING
This section considers the self-cooperative jamming strategy, where the base station enhances the information security of the network by transmitting artificial jamming signal to impair the eavesdropper channel without affecting the legitimate users links by adopting the null-steering beamforming scheme.
A. SYSTEM MODEL Secure communication in NOMA downlink system is investigated, where a base station equipped with N antennas communicates with 2 single antenna paired-users with the presence of eavesdropper. The users paired for communication are denoted as the m-th and the n-th receivers ( h m 2 < h n 2 ), where h m and h n represent the channel between the base station and user m and n respectively. The channel gain between the base station and users represents a Rayleigh fading multiplied by the path loss. In order to impair the eavesdropper capability in self-cooperative jamming strategy, where the base station and in addition to the informationbearing signal transmission, it deploys null-steering beamforming to transmit the artificial jamming signal in the eavesdropper direction, while being canceled in the legitimate users' directions as shown in Figure. 1.
In the proposed scheme, the total transmit power P T is divided between information-bearing signals transmission P S , and artificial jamming transmitting P A with ratio β, i.e., P S = βP T , P A = (1 − β)P T .
The superimposed beamformed base station message for the two corresponding receivers can be expressed as
where s n and s m are the information-bearing signals for the n-th and the m-th users respectively, with
= a m P S . a n and a m are the VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 1. The self-cooperative jamming system model.
NOMA power coefficients for users n and m respectively, with a n < a m and a n + a m = 1.
w n , w m and w e are the beamforming weights for user n, m and the eavesdropper respectively. For the information-bearing signals, the base station implements linear maximum ratio transmission (MRT) precoding strategy, i.e.
{n, m}, where h k represents the complex channel between the base station and user k. While null-steering precoding is adopted for the jamming signal v to maximize it in the eavesdropper direction while being canceled in the legitimate users' directions. The weighting vector for null-steering beamforming can is given by [22] 
where M A(A H A) −1 A H is N * N orthogonal projection matrix onto the subspace spanned by the columns of A, with A [h n h m ], and h e is the complex channel between the base station and the eavesdropper. Hence, w e is in fact the orthogonal projection of h e onto the null space of the legitimize users channels.
The signal received at the n-th user is given by
where z n ∼ CN (0, σ 2 ) is the additive white complex Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the user n terminal. NOMA strong user decodes the weak user information message and subtracts it by means of SIC technique. In addition, the artificial jamming signal lies in the orthogonal subspace of its channel vector and hence h n w e = 0. Thus the signal received at the nth user can be reduced to
The SINR at the strong user can be expressed then as
where ρ = P T σ 2 , the total transmit SNR.
The signal received at user m terminal
where z m ∼ CN (0, σ 2 ) is the AWGN signal at the user m terminal. While the SINR at the weak user terminal can be written as
The eavesdropper receives the information bearing-signals in addition to the artificial jamming signal y e = h e w n s n + h e w m s m + h e w e v + z e ,
where z e ∼ CN (0, σ 2 ) is the AWGN signal at the eavesdropper. The SINR needed by the eavesdropper to decode the legitimate users' information bearing messages under the strong detection capability assumption is given by
B. NEW CHANNEL STATISTICS
In this Subsection, the probability density function (PDF) and the cumulative density function (CDF) of both legitimate and malicious nodes will be derived, in order to derive the secrecy outage probability of the proposed system. The CDF of the user n is given by
The distribution of the random variable X = h n 2 is Gamma with parameter N i.e. (N , 1) , then the CDF of the SINR at the strong user n terminal can be written as
The CDF of the SINR at weak user m terminal can be derived similarly as follows
The random variable h m 2 obeys the Gamma distribution
the exponential distribution with unit mean. Hence, the CDF of user m can be expressed as
The CDF of the SINR at eavesdropper terminal can be expressed as
The distribution of the random variable R =| h e
| 2 is exponential with unit mean, and T = h e w e 2 obeys Gamma distribution (N , 1). And the CDF of the SINR at the eavesdropper can be expressed as
The PDF of the eavesdropper is the direct derivative of its CDF
C. THE SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
The instantaneous secrecy capacity of the user k, where k ∈ (n, m) can be expressed as
where [x] + = max{x, 0}. The secrecy outage probability of the user k is defined as the probability that the instantaneous secrecy capacity C k is less than the target rate R k
where τ k = 2 R k − 1.
1) THE SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY OF THE STRONG USER n
The secrecy outage probability of the legitimate user n can be written in the following form
where (N , i, j) = e
.
2) THE SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY OF THE WEAK USER m
The secrecy outage probability of the user m is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 1: In the proposed system model, the secrecy outage probability of user m under the self-cooperative jamming strategy is expressed as 
III. NONSELF-COOPERATIVE JAMMING
In nonself-cooperative jamming strategy, the PHY security is enhanced by the cooperation of the trusted idle nodes in the network referred to as helpers. Two transmission phases are involved in this strategy. In the first phase, the base station transmits the CSI and the power wirelessly to the helpers. The helpers use the information and the power transferred in the first phase to jam the eavesdropper's channel, while the base station is transmitting information to the intended receivers in the second phase.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
The secure information delivery between the base station and the intended receivers is divided into two main stages.
In the first phase with duration T E the base station equipped with N antenna provides the L helpers with the energy and the eavesdropper's CSI to build the null-steering jamming beamformer.
In the second stage with duration T I , the base station transmits the information-bearing signal to the intended receivers, while the helpers are broadcasting the artificial jamming signal towards the eavesdropper using the harvested power and the acquired CSI in the first phase. Powering the idle users forms an incentive to cooperate and jam since the energy budget at the users terminal is limited and users prefer to use it for the own functions. In the proposed scheme, the total transmit power P T is divided between the SWIPT technique in the phase one and information-bearing signals transmitting in the second phase with ratio θ, 0 < θ < 1. Figure. 2 illustrates the system model of the nonself-cooperative jamming scenario.
B. PHASE ONE: WIRELESS INFORMATION AND POWER TRANSFER
The signal received at the helper i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L} can be expressed as
where h i represents the complex channel between the base station and the helper i, s h is the information-bearing vector with E( s h 2 ) = 1 and n i is the AWGN at the helper i ∈ 1, 2, . . . , L. Helpers adopt power splitting scheme in order to divide the mainstream of the received signal into informationdecoding and energy harvesting with ratio
The harvested energy at the ith user is written as
where ξ i and η i are the power splitting ratio and the energy conversion efficiency at the helper i respectively. We assume that the harvested energy from the noise is small and can be ignored [23] , [24] . Then the jamming transmit power of the ith sensor in the second phase equals to where
, in this work we will consider that all helpers have the same power splitting ratio and energy conversion efficiency factor for the sake of simplicity, i.e. λ i = λ, ∀i ∈ {1, .., L}. Then the transmit power of the user i can be expressed as
C. PHASE 2: INFORMATION AND JAMMING SIGNALS TRANSMISSION
In this phase, the base station is communicating with the intended users, while the helpers are transmitting the jamming signal using the power and the CSI received in the first phase. The superimposed beamformed base station message for the two corresponding receivers can be expressed as
where s n and s m are the information-bearing signals for the n-th and the m-th users respectively, with E(| s n | 2 ) = σ 2 s n = a n θ P T , E(| s m | 2 ) = σ 2 s m = a m θ P T , where a n and a m are the NOMA power coefficients with a n < a m and a n + a m = 1. w n , w m are the beamforming weights for user n and m respectively.
Similarly to the self-cooperative case, the base station implements MRT precoding strategy, i.e.
{n, m}, where h k is the complex channel between the base station and user k as beamforming weights for the intended users. While the helpers adopt the null-steering precoding to transmit the jamming signal in the eavesdropper direction, with being canceled in the legitimate users' directions. The weighting vector for null steering beamforming. Similarly to the first case the signal received at the user n can be expressed as
The SINR at the strong user can be expressed as
The signal at the user m terminal
Hence, the SINR at the weak user terminal can be written in the following form
The eavesdropper receives the information-bearing signal from the base station plus the signal of the jamming nodes.
where g ie is the channel gain between the helper i and the eavesdropper, v ∼ CN (0, 1) is the artificial jamming signal, P i represents the jamming transmit power of the helper number i and w e is a steering vector with unit norm applied in all helpers.
D. NEW CHANNEL STATISTICS
The CDF of the SINR at users n and m terminals can be expressed similarly to the self-cooperative jamming scenario
The SINR needed by the eavesdropper to decode the legitimate users' information bearing messages under strong detection capability assumption is given by
the approximation is achievable for high SNR regime. Where
The random variable of Z i , ∀i ∈ {1, L} is Gamma-Gamma distributed [25] with PDF give by
where K M (.) is the modified Bessel functions of the second kind with order M . The random variables Z i , ∀i ∈ {1, L} are identically distributed and hence their sum can be approximated by a Gamma-Gamma variate [26] , [27] with PDF expresses as
1+0.00124N +0.98L . The PDF of the eavesdropper's SINR is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The PDF of the eavesdropper's SINR in the proposed nonself-cooperative jamming scenario can be written as 
E. THE SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this Subsection, the secrecy outage probability of the both paired users in the nonself-cooperative jamming strategy will be derived. VOLUME 7, 2019
1) THE SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY OF THE STRONG USER n
The secrecy outage probability of the strong user n in the nonself-cooperative jamming scheme is given by the following theorem. Theorem 3: The secrecy outage probability of the strong user n in the proposed scheme is given by P Sout,n = 1− τ n a n θρ
. Proof: See Appendix C.
2) THE SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY OF THE STRONG USER m
Similarly the secrecy outage probability of the weak user m can be given by the following theorem.
Theorem 4: The secrecy outage probability of the weak user m in the proposed scheme is given by
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical simulations are provided to validate the derived analytical results and to illustrate system parameters impact on the considered secrecy scenario. The representative results in the considered network are drawn according to the following NOMA power allocation coefficient a n = 0.2 a m = 0.8 for user n, m respectively. The users' locations in the network are assumed to follow the uniform distribution, with the path loss model 128.1+37.6 * log(r) dB, where r[Km] is the distance between the base station and the user terminal.
The curves shown in Figure 3 represent the derived and the simulated secrecy outage probability for the both paired users as a function of transmit SNR. The curves are drawn for different number of transiting antenna in the self-cooperative jamming strategy. The match between the analytical results and that of the Monte Carlo simulations validates the accuracy of the derived closed-form formula of the both paired users. One can notice that increasing the number of the transmit antenna N improves the secrecy behavior of both users. This is due to the fact that higher number of antennas enhances the quality of the information signal received by the intended receivers as the both random variables h n and h m follow the Gamma distribution with N parameter i.e. (N , 1) . Figure 4 represents the secrecy outage probability of both users as a function of the antenna number in the selfcooperative jamming strategy. The curves are drawn for different values of information to jamming transmission power coefficient β. If β = 0 all power is used for transmitting the jamming signal and no information exchange takes place. If β = 1 the power is used for information transmission and no jamming signal is transmitted. As shown in the Figure, the secrecy outage behavior for both users is improved for values of β less than one, implying that injecting artificial jamming by means of null-steering beamforming enhances the secrecy performance of the considered model. Figure 5 illustrates comparisons between null-steering beamforming jamming and the conventional AN scheme in the self-cooperative strategy. Plotting the secrecy outage probability of both users in the two scenarios as a function of β illustrates that null-steering jamming provides better secrecy outage behavior than that of the AN in NOMA systems. The poor performance of the AN scheme in NOMA system is due to the fact that both NOMA users are affected by the AN signal of the other user causing channel degradation of both legitimate users channels. Meanwhile, in the nullsteering jamming scheme only the eavesdropper channel is impaired by the transmitted artificial jamming signal.
The curves shown in Figure 6 represent the derived and the Monte Carlo simulated secrecy outage probability for the both paired users as a function of total transmit SNR. These curves are plotted for different number of antenna in the nonself-cooperative jamming strategy. Again the exact match between the simulated and the analytical derived results validates our derived analytical results. Increasing the number of the transmit antenna N improves the secrecy behavior of both users in the nonself-cooperative strategy as well. As the high number of antenna enhances the quality of the information signal received by the intended receivers. In addition, increasing the antenna number enhances the channel of the helpers in the energy transfer phase yielding higher levels of the harvested power and higher jamming power in consequence. Figure 7 compares the secrecy outage probability of the both paired users in the nonself-cooperative null-steering and the AN beamforming, by plotting the secrecy outage probability as a function of theta. With the same information to jamming power transmission ratio for both schemes, comparisons yield that NSB in nonself-cooperative jamming scheme has better secrecy performance than that of the AN scheme. This is due to same reason in the self-cooperative scheme, that NSB does not impair the legitimate users' channels but only that of the eavesdropper. One can notice that the secrecy outage probability for null-steering reaches its lowest values at θ < 1 (no jamming signal is transmitted). This implies that the nonself-cooperative jamming enhances the secrecy performance of the proposed NOMA scheme.
The curves shown in Figure 8 draw the secrecy outage probability of the both users versus the number of helpers in the nonself-cooperative jamming scheme for different number of transmitting antenna. It is easy to see that increasing the number of the helpers enhances the outage behavior of the system, as the higher the helpers number the higher the jamming transmission power. As the same energy is transmitted wirelessly in the first phase, but with existed helpers the higher harvested energy level and higher jamming transmission power. Figure 9 compares the self-cooperative jamming and the nonself-cooperative jamming schemes by plotting the secrecy outage probability of the both users as a function of the helpers number. The curves are drawn at the same value of information to jamming transmission power ratio (β) and information to energy transmission power ratio (θ ) (β = θ = 0.7), at the same antenna number (N = 4) and the same transmit SNR (SNR = 20dB). The number of helpers does not affect the outage behavior of the selfcooperative scheme but only that of the nonself-cooperative scheme. The comparison demonstrates that self-cooperative scheme has better secrecy outage performance than that of the nonself-cooperative scheme for small number of helpers. The nonself-cooperative jamming strategy outperforms the selfcooperative jamming when the number of helpers is enough to compensate the energy loss during the SWIPT technique, the SWIPT power splitting ratio (as not all power is used for harvesting some power is used to decode the CSI at the helpers) and the two phases transmission scheme needed by the nonself-cooperative jamming strategy. When the helpers number is high the level of the harvested power at the helpers is higher resulting in higher jamming signal power and higher eavesdropper's channel degradation.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, null-steering jamming is exploited for enhancing the physical layer security in NOMA downlink system. Nullsteering jamming beamformer is exploited in two different strategies namely self and nonself-cooperative jamming. The proposed system is analyzed and the secrecy outage probability of the both paired users are derived and provided in closedform expressions. Comparisons between the conventional AN scheme and the null-steering beamforming yield that the null-steering jamming has better secrecy performance than that of the AN scheme in the considered NOMA system. Furthermore, numerical simulations illustrate that the self-cooperative jamming strategy is more efficient than the nonself-cooperative scheme, as the nonself-cooperative jamming requires a high number of helpers to outperform the self-cooperative strategy.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The secrecy outage probability of user m is expressed as 
By substituting (42) in (41) the secrecy outage probability of the user m can be obtained. The proof is completed.
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The SINR of the eavesdropper to intercept the information message of the user k, k = n.m is given by
The distribution of the random variable a k P T 
The relationship between the exponential function and the Meijer G-function can be expressed 
where (j, i) = The proof is completed.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 3
The secrecy outage probability of the user n in the nonselfcooperative jamming strategy is expressed as . The proof is completed.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF THEOREM 4
The secrecy outage probability of the user m in the nonselfcooperative jamming strategy can be expressed as 
